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Abstract 
Using the example of metal theft in the United Kingdom, this study used mixed methods to evaluate the 
accuracy of police estimates of the involvement of organised crime groups (OCGs) in crime. Police 
estimate that 20—30% of metal theft is committed by OCGs, but this study found that only 0.5% of metal 
thieves had previous convictions for offences related to OCGs, that only 1.3% were linked to OCGs by 
intelligence information, that metal thieves typically offended close to their homes and that almost no metal 
thefts involved sophisticated offence methods. It appears that police may over-estimate the involvement of 
OCGs in some types of crime. The reasons for and consequences of this over-estimation are discussed.  
Keywords: metal theft, organised crime, police perceptions of crime, evidence-based policing 
  
 2 
Introduction 
Metal has long been a valuable commodity and so been vulnerable to thieves who seek to resell metal for 
scrap (Bennett, 2008). In the past decade the extent of the problem has increased substantially, driven by 
increases in demand for (and prices of) many non-ferrous metals (Sidebottom et al., 2011, 2014). Metal 
thefts have a substantial impact on critical infrastructure such as railways and power networks, causing 
extensive damage and widespread disruption to the public (Ashby et al., 2014).  
The emergence of metal theft as a crime problem has lead to significant interest among policy makers. 
One centre of this interest has been the presumed involvement of OCGs in metal theft. Both the United 
Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) organised-crime threat assessments identify OCGs as being 
involved in metal theft (HM Government, 2013, 21; Europol, 2013, 25), a link also discussed in the media 
(e.g. Buckley, 2007; Carter, 2013). British Transport Police (BTP) estimates that up to 30% of metal theft 
is committed by OCGs, while the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) states that there are 205 
OCGs involved in metal theft in Britain (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2012). In a report for 
the UK Home Office, Mills et al. (2013) estimated that 20% of metal theft related to organised crime.  
These estimates have generally been accepted uncritically. However, there is reason to think that 
official sources may over-estimate the involvement of OCGs in crime problems. Mills et al. (2013) reported 
police estimates of OCGs involvement in various crimes, but these appear to differ substantially from what 
might be expected based on available evidence. For example, all cash-in-transit robberies were judged to be 
committed by OCGs, even though several previous studies have found some to be committed by amateur, 
opportunistic offenders (Willis, 2006; Hepenstal & Johnson, 2010). Similarly, all distraction burglaries 
were claimed to be committed by OCGs, despite a recent review by Gorden & Buchanan (2013, 502) 
noting most offenders were dependent on drugs or alcohol.  
Felson & Boba (2010, 11) argued that the public often overestimate the degree to which offending is 
organised, that advanced levels of organisation are unnecessary for most types of crime, and that such 
organisation makes some crimes more difficult by introducing needless complexity. Although police 
officers can be expected to know more about crime than members of the public would, previous research 
suggests that officers’ perceptions are sometimes inaccurate. Ratcliffe & McCullagh (2001) found that 
officers could not pinpoint the locations of vehicle-crime hotspots, while Roach & Pease (2014) found that 
officers substantially overestimated the homogeneity of offending careers. Gregory (2003) found that 
police descriptions of the geographic reach of OCGs and the ethnic make-up of their members were not 
supported by analysis of police intelligence information. These examples illustrate the importance of 
empirically validating police perceptions of a crime problem.  
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The present study 
The purpose of the present study was to seek evidence to test police estimates of the involvement of OCGs 
in metal theft. This is important for several reasons. Firstly, in many countries OCG involvement in a crime 
attracts additional funding or involvement of specialist units; unnecessary allocation of such resources may 
cause needless expense or shortages elsewhere. Secondly, police often have additional legal powers to 
combat OCGs — for example freezing and subsequent forfeiture of financial assets — that are unavailable 
otherwise (Finckenauer, 2005, 70). Use of these powers when there is no actual involvement of OCGs may 
lead to disproportionate interference with suspects’ rights. Thirdly, OCG involvement may make it easier to 
attract support for police action from politicians, the media and the public, but perceptions of police 
legitimacy may be damaged if such support subsequently appears to have been based on a false premise.  
At the tactical level, what works to prevent organised crime may not work if the crime is largely 
committed by criminals not linked to OCGs. Attempts to tackle OCGs typically focus on long, expensive 
and complicated criminal investigations that aim to incapacitate offenders through imprisonment. This may 
be an effective method of crime prevention if offences are being committed by a small number of offenders 
or offender groups. However, there is substantial evidence that for many crime problems, prevention 
activity is most effective when it is focused on protecting potential targets and securing places, rather than 
focusing on offenders (Clarke, 1997). Thus an erroneous (but well intentioned) focus on investigating 
OCGs may deflect police resources from activities that could have a much larger impact on crime.  
In order to identify the degree to which OCGs are involved in metal theft, it is necessary to consider 
what an OCG is. This question has received sustained academic attention (Albanese, 2000, and 
Finckenauer, 2005, provide reviews) but this has not resulted in the formulation of a single widely accepted 
definition (Gregory, 2003, 79). In the absence of such a definition, the present study sought to establish the 
extent of OCG involvement in metal theft by firstly identifying features of the metal-theft phenomenon that 
practitioners have used to support their proposition that OCGs are involved, and then to empirically test 
whether the metal-theft problem does in fact have those features. The involvement of OCGs in metal theft 
is therefore not measured against a universal definition of an OCG (since none exists) but against the 
features described by practitioners. If evidence of those features is found, it can be said that metal theft 
involves OCGs in the manner described by practitioners. If no such evidence is found, this would suggest 
that metal theft does not have those features, i.e. either that OCGs are not involved in metal theft or are 
involved in some way not identified by practitioners.  
In order to identify features of metal theft that could be tested, discussions were held with a variety of 
practitioners (including detectives, intelligence analysts and representatives of infrastructure companies) 
who were members of an EU project that aimed to increase and exchange knowledge of metal theft. 
Previous official reports and statements by practitioners were also analysed. From this process, four 
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features of metal theft that practitioners claim suggests the involvement of OCGs were identified that could 
be tested with data that could be made available. To validate this process, the identified features were 
presented to and agreed by the members of the EU project.  
The first identified feature (F1) was that if OCGs are involved in metal theft, it is likely that metal 
thieves would have previously been involved in offences commonly associated with OCGs, such as drug 
trafficking or counterfeiting currency. This statement could be tested by analysing the criminal histories of 
known metal thieves.  
Since the secretive nature of OCGs often makes prosecutions difficult, it is possible that such groups 
might be involved in metal theft without that being evident from criminal records. To account for this 
possibility, the second feature (F2) was that if OCGs are involved in metal theft then police would be likely 
to hold intelligence information suggesting that individual metal thieves are involved in OCGs, even if that 
involvement could not be proven in court. This statement could be tested by analysing information held by 
the National Crime Agency (NCA) about the involvement of metal thieves in other offending.  
One feature of metal theft cited by police, government and infrastructure companies as evidence of the 
involvement of OCGs is the willingness of offenders to travel “hundreds of miles” to steal metal (see, for 
example, House of Commons Transport Committee, 2012). More generally, if OCGs were commonly 
involved in metal theft, it might be expected that OCG members who steal metal would make use of the 
capabilities of such groups to travel further than other offenders are able to do in order to find the most 
suitable targets for offending, both while stealing metal and in their other offending (F3). Evidence on the 
distance to crime for OCG offenders is limited, but van Daele & vander Beken (2009, 5) found that OCG 
members in Belgium travelled a mean distance of 25 miles (40 kilometres) in order to offend, compared to 
11 miles (17 km) for other acquisitive-crime offenders.  
The final feature (F4) was that if OCGs are involved in metal theft then it might be expected that some 
metal thieves would use sophisticated methods to steal metal, using the capabilities and resources of an 
OCG to maximise their profit from an offence. For example, a metal thief linked to an OCG might be able 
to obtain forged documents that would allow them to steal large amounts of railway cable from a storage 
depot, while an offender without such links could only obtain smaller amounts of metal left lying at the side 
of railway lines. This statement could be tested by analysing the methods used by offenders to steal metal.  
The identified features are not binary. Even the highest estimates of the involvement of OCGs in metal 
theft — for example those reported by House of Commons Transport Committee (2012) — suggest that 
many metal thefts are committed by offenders unassociated with OCGs. Conversely, it is known that 
people who commit very serious crimes also commit minor offences (Roach, 2007), so some OCG 
members would be likely to be found in a sample of offenders convicted of any crime, however minor. 
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Assessing the validity of the statements is therefore one of degree rather than of category: the operant 
question is ‘if OCGs were involved in metal theft to the extent claimed by the police, would we expect this 
feature to be present to this extent?’.  
Data 
The methods used in this study required data on people known or believed to have stolen metal. For this 
purpose, BTP provided details of every person who had been arrested for metal theft from railway lines 
between 2007 and 2013. The NCA then provided data on the criminal records of these offenders from the 
Police National Computer (PNC), as well as a summary of any intelligence information held on their 
involvement in organised crime.  
BTP has been collecting data on metal thieves for longer than any other UK force, allowing the use of 
the largest possible sample. Although people who steal metal from the railway network may be different to 
those who steal metal from elsewhere, half of arrests for metal thefts in the sample did not relate to thefts 
from the railway1. As such, it is believed that the sample represented the best available source of 
information about metal thieves.  
Some studies of criminal history data analyse only offences for which offenders have been convicted. 
However, the criminal justice system is designed to avoid false convictions even at the expense of many 
false acquittals, while many reasons for acquittal do not relate to the accused’s guilt: a witness may die or 
move to another city, physical evidence might be lost and so on. The over-riding duty to prevent false 
convictions is essential in court, but criminological research requires a finer balance of risk between falsely 
including or excluding cases: using only convictions would prevent false positives, but at the expense of 
ignoring the problem of false negatives. To strike this balance, offenders were included in the final sample 
if they had been either charged with or cautioned for a metal theft (referred to below as being sanctioned 
for that offence). A person may only be sanctioned if a prosecutor (or in certain minor cases, a specially 
trained police officer) believes “that an objective, impartial and reasonable jury † is more likely than not to 
convict the defendant of the charge alleged” (Crown Prosecution Service, 2013, 6). Of the 1,084 people in 
the initial sample, 243 were excluded because they had never been sanctioned for metal theft. A further two 
offenders were excluded because of apparent mistakes in recording their details on PNC, so the final 
sample consisted of 839 offenders. Individual offences were included in the analysis only if the person had 
either been sanctioned for that offence.  
Due to restrictions on the use of personal data, it was not possible to obtain data on other offenders (i.e. 
those who have never been arrested for metal theft) to form a control group. In order to minimise the extent 
to which this absence limited analysis of the data that were available, in the following sections comparisons 
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are made to other sources (e.g. Gregory, 2003; van Daele & vander Beken, 2009; Francis et al., 2013), 
where possible.  
Characteristics of metal thieves 
Of the 839 metal thieves in the sample, 97% were male and 94% were white. This compares to an overall 
picture of 78% of offenders on PNC who were male and 81% who were white (Francis et al., 2013, 21,23), 
and higher than the 70% of OCG members studied by Gregory (2003, 88) who were white. Eighty-three 
percent of metal thieves were British nationals — broadly comparable to the 80% of UK nationals among 
offenders studied by Francis et al. (2013, 21) — 12% were nationals of other EU member states and the 
remaining 5% were nationals of non-EU countries. The most common non-UK nationalities were 
Romanian (8%), Polish (1%) and Irish (1%).  
The median age of offenders when they were first sanctioned for an offence was 16.4 years, with 61% 
of offenders first sanctioned while still a juvenile (i.e. aged under 18). This is a higher proportion than the 
46% of offenders first sanctioned while under 18 reported by Francis et al. (2013, 30). The median length 
of a criminal career for offenders in the sample was 9.7 years2, during which offenders received a median 
of 1.9 sanctions per year, much higher than for most offenders on PNC (Francis et al., 2013, 94). Half of 
metal thieves met the UK Ministry of Justice definition of chronic offending — having been sanctioned for 
15 or more offences (Ministry of Justice, 2013, 12) — compared to 5% of offenders in England and Wales 
(Owen & Cooper, 2013, 11).  
Half of metal thieves had been sanctioned for an offence related to metal theft only once, with 75% 
sanctioned for metal theft either once or twice. At the other extreme of the distribution, 10% of metal 
thieves (n = 84) were responsible for 31% of metal-theft sanctions, and 5% of thieves (n = 42) were 
responsible for 19% of sanctions. Nevertheless, for most offenders metal theft formed only a minority of 
their offending (15% of sanctions in the median case). This held largely true even for offenders (n = 31) 
sanctioned for more than five metal thefts, for whom a median of 25% of all sanctions related to metal 
theft.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 shows the number of metal thieves sanctioned for offences in different categories. 
Unsurprisingly, theft was the type of offence most metal thieves had been involved in, followed by criminal 
damage and offences related to the criminal-justice system. This latter category includes offences such as 
failing to appear at court, breaches of police or court orders and so on. Metal thieves had varied offending 
histories: 92% of offenders who had been sanctioned for more than one offence had been sanctioned for 
offences in more than one of the categories shown in Table 1. The most common single offences for which 
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offenders were sanctioned were shoplifting, driving without insurance, possessing controlled drugs (most 
often cannabis, amphetamine and heroin), failing to surrender after being released on bail and driving while 
disqualified. More than half of metal thieves (58%) had at least one sanction for an offence related to 
misuse of drugs or alcohol.  
Overall, it appears that metal thieves are diverse, persistent, high-rate offenders who are likely to be 
male, white and slightly older than the typical offender.  
Previous convictions for organised crime 
Evaluating F1 — that if OCGs are involved in metal theft then metal thieves will have previously been 
involved in other organised crimes — required use of an approach developed by Francis et al. (2013, 12) 
for comparing OCG offenders with “general” offenders. PNC does not include a record of whether or not 
offences are related to organised crime, so Francis et al. (2013) deemed offences to be “indicative” of an 
offender’s involvement in an OCG if:  
1. the offence was of a type believed to be associated with OCGs (see Francis et al., 2013, 83—89 
for a list),  
2. the offender was sentenced with at least one co-offender, and  
3. the offender was sentenced to at least three years in prison. 
The 185 offences believed to be associated with OCGs were defined by a panel of researchers, policy 
makers and practitioners experienced in dealing with organised crime (for details, see Francis et al., 2013, 
14). The offences included illegally importing or supplying commodities such as firearms, trademarked 
goods or controlled drugs; controlling prostitution or people trafficking; serious violence (particularly 
involving kidnapping or explosives) and money laundering or other serious fraud. This method of 
identifying offences indicative of involvement in an OCG is not unproblematic, but using it here allows 
comparison of metal thieves to the group of “general offenders” studied in that article.  
Of the 839 metal thieves in the final sample, four (0.5%) had a previous conviction that suggested their 
involvement in an OCG according to this definition. This compares to 0.2% of all offenders on PNC 
between 2007 and 2010 who had a relevant organised-crime conviction (Francis et al., 2013, 14). All four 
convictions were for money laundering, and all related to laundering the proceeds of metal theft from 
railways — none of the offenders in the sample had a conviction for an organised-crime offence that was 
not linked to metal theft. The criminal records of these offenders showed that three had multiple 
convictions for acquisitive offences and possession of controlled drugs, suggesting that drug addiction may 
have driven their offending.  
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The objective of this classification was to identify offences that may be linked to organised crime, not 
to make a definitive identification. It is unlikely that all instances of any crime type would be linked to 
organised crime, and so it is possible that this procedure may have erroneously classified some offences as 
being related to OCGs that were not. Conversely, the requirement for a co-offender to also be not only 
identified but convicted, and for a particular minimum sentence to be imposed, might have resulted in some 
offences that were committed by OCGs not being identified. Although this method is imperfect, the very 
small number of metal thieves with previous convictions for offences believed to be related to organised 
crime suggests that the involvement of OCGs in metal theft may be less than previously believed, and that 
there is little evidence to support F1 except for a very small number of metal thieves.  
Intelligence on links to organised crime 
PNC data are inevitably limited because they only include information on specific offences that the police 
can demonstrate the person committed. To deal with this limitation, the personal details of each offender 
were checked against a variety of NCA organised-crime intelligence databases. These databases contain 
information about a range of criminality that the police suspect — but sometimes cannot prove — a person 
is involved in.  
The sensitivity of the intelligence data mean that only limited information can be reported, even in 
aggregate form. Two categories of offenders were identified with potential links to OCGs, together 
comprising 11 known metal thieves (1.3% of the sample). This compares to an estimated 41,100 members 
of 9,200 OCGs that the police believe are involved in different types of organised crime across the UK 
(Association of Chief Police Officers, 2012, 27).  
The first category was of offenders suspected of being involved in the supply of controlled drugs. Mills 
et al. (2013, 22) claimed that all drugs supply in the UK involves organised crime, but it does not follow 
that every person involved at any stage of the process is a member of an OCG. Natarajan (2006, 179) found 
that 70% of people in a drug network were linked to only one other member. The available data did not 
allow identification of how central to a drug network the metal thieves were. However, all but one of the 
offenders in this category had multiple convictions for volume-crime offences such as shoplifting, failing to 
attend court and burglary, as well as at least one conviction related to alcohol or drug misuse. Two of the 
offenders had previous convictions for the supply of drugs, although in both cases this was a minority of 
their known offending. Although the available evidence is limited, on the balance of probabilities it appears 
that these offenders are more likely to be peripheral to any drugs-supply network than to be part of a core 
group, and appear to be more heavily involved in petty crimes than in those related to OCGs.  
The second category of interest comprised offenders who were suspected of involvement in people 
trafficking. Like other types of criminal network, people-trafficking groups involve several different types 
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of offender: those responsible for moving victims clandestinely into or within the UK, those who control 
victims and those who use the victims, for example for sexual or labour exploitation. Although it was not 
possible to identify the roles of metal thieves in any people-trafficking networks, one had a previous 
conviction that indicated he had sexually abused a child as a ‘customer’ of a people-trafficking group. All 
the offenders in this group also had convictions for volume-crime offences, with offences related to 
alcohol-misuse (such as drink driving) being particularly prevalent.  
Metal theft appeared to be peripheral to the offending careers of most offenders who were linked by 
intelligence to OCGs, with all but two such offenders being sanctioned for metal theft either once or twice. 
The narrative offence methods recorded on PNC for nine of the eleven offenders gave no indication that the 
metal thefts they were sanctioned for were any more sophisticated than for other offenders. The remaining 
two offenders appeared to be part of groups involved in stealing large volumes of metal in multiple parts of 
the country. As with F1, it appears that evidence to support F2 exists for only a very small minority of 
metal thieves, and that those offenders who are linked to an OCG are likely to be both on the periphery of 
that group and only incidentally involved in metal theft.  
Distance to crime 
The third statement was examined by calculating the straight-line distance between each offence location 
and the offender’s last known home address at the time of the offence. Previous journey-to-crime research 
has typically made such calculations based on the offender’s home (see Townsley & Sidebottom, 2010, for 
a review), although offenders may travel to offences from an alternative base. When offender addresses had 
not been recorded at the time of arrest, the most-recent known address for that offender was used unless it 
was more than one year old (in which case the offence was excluded from the analysis). Distances to crime 
were calculated for 82% of all offences and 68% of metal thefts. When multiple offenders were identified 
for an offence, their journeys were treated separately.  
The mean distance to crime for all offending (including metal theft) was 6.8 miles (11.0 km), slightly 
longer than mean distances found in studies reviewed by Townsley & Sidebottom (2010, 900) but much 
less than the mean distance of 25 miles (40 km) travelled by the acquisitive OCG offenders studied by van 
Daele & vander Beken (2009, 5). However, the distribution of distances was heavily skewed and so the 
mean value (although commonly used in distance-to-crime research) is not representative: 40% of offences 
occurred within one mile of the offender’s home and 58% within two miles; only 7% involved travelling 
more than 20 miles.  
It might be expected that the distance travelled to commit a metal theft would be higher than that for 
offending generally, because the opportunity to steal metal exists only in certain locations. However, the 
increase in distance appeared to be small, with 31% of metal-theft sanctions being for offences within one 
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mile of the offender’s home address and 47% within two miles; only 10% involved travelling further than 
20 miles.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Statistics based on aggregate distance-to-crime calculations might be misleading because they fail to 
account for potential variation between offenders and within the career of each offender. At the offender 
level, there are two potential measures of distance to crime: how far the offender typically travels, and the 
farthest they have ever been known to travel. Figure 1 shows these values as the distribution of median and 
maximum distances travelled by each offender. It can be seen that offenders typically travelled only a short 
distance, and that very few were ever sanctioned for offences further than 20 miles from their home.  
Distances to metal thefts were broadly similar to those travelled for other offences: half of offenders 
committed half of their metal thefts within 2.3 miles (3.7 km) of home and all of their metal thefts within 
3.0 miles (4.8 km). Only 17% of offenders had been sanctioned for a metal theft more than 10 miles from 
their home address, but a very small number of offenders were prepared to travel further: 1.4% of offenders 
had been sanctioned for a metal theft more than 100 miles from home.  
Overall, it appears that a minority of metal thieves are prepared to travel moderate distances to steal 
metal and to offend in general, but — as has been found for other crime types — most metal thieves 
commit most of their offences very close to home. It is possible that this result is vulnerable to sampling 
bias, if offenders are more likely to be linked to offences committed closer to their homes. However, this 
potential source of error can be mitigated by comparing the present results to those of other distance-to-
crime studies that used the same methods. Relatively, the distance traveled by metal thieves — both in 
general and specifically to steal metal — appeared to be much more similar to that found by previous 
studies of volume-crime offenders than those found by van Daele & vander Beken (2009) for members of 
OCGs. If willingness to travel long distances is a feature of an OCG, it appears to be a feature that is 
present for only a very small number of metal thieves.  
Offence methods 
Offence records on PNC include a free-text description — written by the investigating officer — of the 
offence method (modus operandi). The descriptions are relatively short (median length 29 words), limiting 
what could be elicited from them. A more-detailed source of method descriptions would have been the case 
files submitted by officers at the conclusion of an investigation. However, these are held by individual 
police forces (often on paper) and so it would have been impracticable to obtain a national picture in this 
way.  
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To create a reasonably sized corpus for analysis, methods for 400 metal thefts (25% of all metal thefts 
in the sample) were randomly selected. Grounded, descriptive codes were generated by the author to 
identify methods that were sophisticated or otherwise indicated the involvement of OCGs3.  
Very few methods involved any degree of sophistication. Many appeared to be simple, for example:  
“Suspect and younger friend † walked past a quantity of lead in an alleyway, returned home to pick 
up a bag then returned and placed [the metal] in a holdall to sell it at a local scrap merchant.” 
or  
“Suspect drove [small motor vehicle] to trackside and cut [electrical cable] with a hacksaw. About 
150 metres of copper cable was removed, coiled up and placed in his vehicle.” 
Offenders used simple equipment — hacksaws, screwdrivers and pliers — to cut-up metal (mentioned in 
10% of cases) and wheeled rubbish bins or shopping trolleys to transport metal. Vehicles (mentioned in 
22% of cases) were usually panel vans or ordinary cars, although there were also offenders on pedal cycles 
or on foot (mentioned in 8% of cases). Co-offenders were mentioned in 40% of cases, but often in 
conjunction with very simple methods, e.g.  
“Male in company with two others used his girlfriend’s car to drive to railway line † jumped over 
fence and went onto tracks to collect any metal that was on the ground, passing it back over the fence 
to his two accomplices.” 
Nine offences (2% of the sample) involved an unusual degree of sophistication. Seven records 
described conspiracies between multiple offenders to steal large quantities of metal, while five involved the 
use of lorries equipped with cranes to remove large quantities of metal. In one case, the offenders had 
developed a technique to bypass systems designed to detect cable thefts, while one offence involved forged 
documentation used to convince security staff that the thieves had permission to remove scrap metal from a 
railway depot. It should be emphasised, however, that these offence methods stood out for how unusual 
they were: overall, there was little evidence to support F4.  
Discussion 
The results presented here suggest that in almost all metal thefts there is no evidence of the involvement of 
an OCG. The 0.5% of metal thieves with a previous conviction indicative of OCG membership (F1) was 
similar to the 0.2% of all UK offenders with such a conviction. Although 1.3% of known metal thieves 
were linked to an OCG by police intelligence (F2), this represents 0.02% of estimated UK OCGs members. 
Very few metal thieves appear to travel long distances to offend (F3), with almost all exhibiting travel 
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patterns similar to those of ‘normal’ volume-crime offenders. Finally, only 2% of metal thefts were found 
to exhibit methodological sophistication that might be indicative of the involvement of OCGs (F4). Metal 
thieves are not typical offenders — they seem to be far more prolific than most — but there is little 
evidence of any but a few being involved in OCGs.  
The limitations of each method are discussed in the relevant sections above. One general limitation of 
using PNC data is that some offenders may never be arrested, and that offences for which offenders are 
detained are not representative of their total offending. However, the 12% of metal thefts that lead to an 
offender being sanctioned (Robb et al., 2014) compares favourably to similar studies reviewed by Bowers 
& Johnson (2015, 119). Furthermore, common alternative data-collection strategies suffer from similar 
issues. Offender interviews can cover undetected offending by known offenders, but provide no 
information about unknown offenders. The relatively small number of offenders who steal metal 
(compared, for example, to the number who shoplift) makes self-report surveys impracticable.  
Given these limitations, it is likely that there will be some degree of inaccuracy in the estimates of 
OCG involvement produced by each method. However, the difference between the results presented here 
and the official estimates discussed above is large enough that it is unlikely to be solely due to inaccuracies 
based on data or methods. For example, the 2% of metal thefts with methods sophisticated enough to 
suggest the involvement of an OCG would have to be an underestimate by a factor of ten to reach the 
estimated proportion of offences linked to OCGs estimated by Mills et al. (2013) and by a factor of fifteen 
to approach the police estimates reported by House of Commons Transport Committee (2012). One 
limitation of this comparison is that the police estimates relate to the proportion of crimes related to OCGs 
and the results of analysis relating to F1 and F2 relate to the proportion of offenders linked to OCGs. If 
OCG-linked metal thieves were prolific metal thieves, a small proportion of such offenders might account 
for a higher proportion of crime. However, the results presented above show that the most prolific metal 
thieves are not those with links to OCGs, with only two metal thieves linked by intelligence to OCGs 
having more than two sanctions for metal theft.  
It therefore seems clear that the involvement of OCGs in metal theft is substantially less than is 
estimated by police officers working on metal-theft cases. This might seem a surprising result because 
police officers might be expected to know the evidence base in their field of expertise. It is therefore 
important to ask: why might officers over-estimate the involvement of OCGs in crime?  
One answer might be that police are simply pre-disposed to look for OCGs, particularly when a new 
crime problem occurs. There are two potential reasons for this. Firstly, crimes committed by OCGs tend to 
cause more concern among both the public and professionals than comparable offences without an 
organised-crime link (Woodiwiss & Hobbs, 2009). Secondly, there is a strong tendency towards causal 
reductionism in thinking about crime: people preferentially ascribe changes in crime rates to a single cause 
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rather than a complex interaction between multiple factors (Montgomery, 1996, 109). The involvement of 
OCGs may provide a more appealing and simple explanation for a crime problem than other explanations, 
such as the behaviour of a large number of unconnected minor criminals being simultaneously influenced 
by changes in metal prices (Sidebottom et al., 2014) or fluctuating demand in the Chinese construction 
industry (Sidebottom et al., 2011). This is not a criticism of individual police officers — particularly those 
who have understood the influence of economic factors in metal theft — but rather a statement of how 
external factors can influence police decision-making.  
Once practitioners or policy makers look for the involvement of OCGs in a crime type, the breadth of 
modern definitions of organised crime make it highly likely that they will find it. The UK government has 
recently adopted (in section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015) the definition of an OCG set out in the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC). This has four elements: 
(a) that the group contain three or more persons, (b) that the group exist “for a period of time”, (c) that 
group members commit “serious crimes” (defined in the UK as an offence carrying a maximum penalty of 
seven or more years in prison, regardless of the actual sentence imposed) and (d) that they intend to obtain 
material benefit  (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004, 5). In the case of metal theft in the UK, 
the last two elements will always be present: the offence of theft carries a maximum sentence of seven 
years imprisonment, and theft is intrinsically done for material gain. The analysis of offence methods above 
showed that at least 40% of metal thefts involved more than one offender, so the only remaining 
requirement is the need for the group to exist “for a period of time”. Since no minimum time is specified, 
this could be taken simply as meaning that whenever two metal thefts are committed by the same multiple 
offenders, they become an OCG. This does not mean, of course, that any multiple of thieves would be 
considered an OCG by a person on the street, but the definition is so broad that almost any such group 
could be defined as an OCG within it. The number of false-positive cases seems to be limited only by 
whether practitioners choose to apply the definition to its full extent in a particular case.  
Once a person or organisation believes they have identified OCGs as being involved in a particular 
crime problem, that involvement is likely to become received wisdom as a result of the operation of two 
cognitive processes outlined by Tversky & Kahneman (1973). The “availability heuristic” is the human 
tendency to give disproportionate weight to information that easily comes to mind. In the case of metal 
theft, information that supports pre-existing ideas about likely causes of a problem — such as ‘metal theft 
is committed by OCGs’ — is likely to be repeated and therefore more easily come to mind, which in turn 
means it more easily comes to mind and is more likely to be repeated. The “representativeness heuristic” 
describes how people are more likely to believe something to be of a particular type if that thing is similar 
to the stereotypical description of things of that type. For example, people may believe metal theft to be 
committed by OCGs because it has features — such as being done for economic gain and causing 
substantial damage to society — that are stereotypically associated with OCGs. Confirmation bias — the 
tendency to give greater weight to evidence that supports existing ideas than to evidence that does not 
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(Wason, 1960) — is also likely to push those who have chosen to look for OCGs into believing they have 
found them (for further discussion of how confirmation bias can influence police perceptions of crime 
problems, see Townsley et al., 2011, 165). Put more simply, estimates of OCG involvement in crime 
problems risk “becoming self-referential, recycling the prevailing values and priorities of the political and 
law enforcement agencies consulted” (Edwards & Levi, 2008, 373).  
It should be emphasised that nothing in the preceding explanation should be read as a criticism of 
individual practitioners or policy makers who believe OCGs are involved in metal theft. In particular, some 
senior BTP officers have spoken publicly of the link between metal prices and the rate of metal theft. The 
social and cognitive biases described here are not failures of individuals, but rather the products of how 
humans have evolved to think, both individually and in society. It is the inevitability of these biases 
influencing our thinking that makes the application of empirical study so important and the increasing 
interest among practitioners in “evidence-based policing” (Sherman, 1998) so welcome.  
There is reason to believe that moving the focus of efforts to prevent metal theft away from the 
prosecution of OCGs may help practitioners and policy makers to prevent metal theft. With the exception 
of crime problems involving a single serial offender, incapacitating criminals is often ineffective at 
reducing crime because the chance of a given offence ending in imprisonment is extremely low (Barclay & 
Tavares, 1999). It is often more effective to employ problem-oriented policing methods 
(Goldstein, 1979; Eck & Spelman, 1987) such as crime scripts (Cornish, 1994) to identify the points in the 
metal-theft process at which police can have most impact. Indeed, this approach has already allowed police 
to identify scrap-metal dealers as key actors in metal theft and to use that understanding to reduce thefts 
(Morgan et al., 2015). There is some evidence to suggest that shifting to a focus on situational prevention 
measures of the type often used in problem-oriented policing may be effective at preventing crime even if a 
large proportion of it does involve OCGs. Edwards & Levi (2008, 375) argued that OCG members were 
likely to respond to changes in the environment just as other criminals do, and that situational prevention 
could be an effective and inexpensive way to prevent crimes committed by OCGs. Similarly, Hancock & 
Laycock (2010) showed that crime scripts can be useful in identifying the points in the process of 
committing a crime at which interventions against OCGs are likely to be most effective.  
The benefits of moving from an enforcement-based approach to a focus on prevention may extend 
beyond the specific problem of metal theft. There is a common perception that the involvement of OCGs in 
crime is often underestimated (van den Bunt, 2004; Kleemans, 2007; Dubourg & Prichard, 2007), at times 
taking on the appearance of a moral panic (Woodiwiss & Hobbs, 2009) in which it is asserted OCGs are a 
threat “the magnitude and seriousness of which cannot be overestimated” (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1988, 15). By contrast, relatively little attention has been given to the possibility that OCG 
involvement might be overestimated. The present results illustrate the importance of balancing potential 
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sources of error in any estimate of OCG involvement in a crime to ensure that exclusive focus on avoiding 
underestimation does not make overestimation more likely.  
The present research was the first to study the involvement of OCGs in metal theft, leaving several 
potential avenues for further study. Firstly, offender interviews could be used to attempt to identify any 
links between OCGs and metal theft not identified using the present methods. Secondly, it is likely that the 
present results will not translate to other countries, and this should be explored. The UK may be particular 
because — although part of the EU — the UK has a land border with only one other member state and is 
not part of the Schengen border-free zone. The UK also has less experience of very large, hierarchical 
OCGs such as those found in Sicily or some part of the United States. These factors may serve to limit the 
influence of organised crime in the UK compared to other countries. Thirdly, the present research only 
looked for potential involvement of OCGs in the theft of metal itself, not the subsequent handling of stolen 
metal. Although stolen metal is believed to be commonly disposed of by simply selling it to local scrap 
yards (Ashby & Bowers, 2015), it is possible that additional regulation of such facilities (recently 
introduced to curb metal theft) may make illicit processing of stolen metal attractive to OCGs that provide 
similar services for other types of illicit property.  
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Notes 
1 Since metal theft is not a distinct crime category on PNC, all theft offences were categorised into metal 
and non-metal thefts based on the narrative PNC offence method. 
2 Criminal careers were calculated as the length of time between each offender’s first and last sanction, as 
of the date on which data were extracted from PNC. It is likely that some offenders will go on to commit 
further offences in future, and so their careers will extend beyond that described here. 
3 It was not possible for multiple researchers to independently code these values because access to the 
database required expensive and time-consuming security clearance that the agency providing the data were 
not able to provide for more than one researcher.  
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Table 1: Offence categories for which metal thieves have been charged/cautioned. 
 
Offence type  Offenders  %  
Theft  839  100  
Criminal damage  494  59 
Offences related to police/courts/prisons  467  56  
Drugs possession, supply or manufacture  442  53  
Violence (excluding sexual violence)  415  49  
Public disorder  347  41  
Weapons possession or supply  235  28  
Fraud  176  21  
Sexual offences  48  6  
Other  460  55  
 
Figure 1: Median and maximum distances to crime for all offences committed by each offender. 
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